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For the third time since the end of World War II, the 
United States is engaged in a long-term defense build- 
down. Through fiscal 1992, real defense outlays have 
been reduced by 11  percent from their 1987 level, a 
decline  equal to  1.1  percent of real GDP.  Under the 
Bush Administration's fiscal 1993 budget submission to 
the Congress, real defense outlays would continue to 
decline through fiscal 1997,  producing cumulative 
reductions of 28 percent or $80 billion in 1987 dollars. 
Under  this  scenario,  real  defense  spending  would 
decline from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1987 to 3.6 percent 
by 1997, the lowest share of total output in the entire 
post-World War II period. 
Considerably deeper cuts have been advocated and 
cannot  be  ruled  out.  For example,  the fiscal 1993 
defense appropriations approved by Congress provide 
defense budget authority of $274 billion, $7 billion less 
than originally requested by the President. Pressure  for 
cutting defense spending will likely intensify during the 
fiscal 1994 budget cycle as the discretionary spending 
caps of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 become 
more binding while the "fire  wall" between defense and 
nondefense discretionary spending is removed. 
In the long run, the economy is likely to benefit from 
lower defense spending as resources are released for 
more productive uses. However,  considerable short-run 
pain  will accompany the transition. Since 1987, employ- 
ment  in  defense-related  industries  has  declined  by 
roughly 440,000, while the number of active duty mili- 
tary  personnel has fallen  by 300,000 and Department  of 
Defense civilian employees have declined by 100,000. 
These workers,  many of whom  had high-skill,  high- 
wage jobs, are being displaced into a relatively weak 
labor market. 
This article  provides a broad overview of the current 
defense build-down.' In the first section, aggregate sta- 
tistics are used to compare this build-down with earlier 
build-downs of the post-World War II period. The sec- 
ond section assesses the size of the "peace dividend"; 
the third considers the contribution of the build-down to 
the  current  lackluster state  of the economy. Finally, 
regional and industry-level effects are reviewed. 
The current defense build-down in perspective 
Since the build-down following the end of World War II, 
U.S. defense spending has gone through  three  long 
cycles associated with  the  Korean War,  the Vietnam 
War, and the Carter-Reagan defense buildup, hereafter 
termed the "Cold War" (Chart 1). The  build-down phase 
of the Cold War cycle began with the passage of the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings  I). But it was not until 
fiscal 1987  that actual real defense outlays as  a percent 
of GDP peaked and the reversal got under way.2 By 
fiscal 1997  real defense outlays are likely to be 28 to  38 
percent  below  the 1987 level,  while total defense- 
'Much of the backround work for this article was done by Ethan 
Harris. Paul  Ludwig. and Cynthia Silverio. 
21n this article, fiscal 1987 is the peak in the Cold War defense 
spending cycle because constant dollar defense outlays (measured 
on a unified budget basis) as a percent of real GOP peaked in that 
year. However, the absolute level of constant dollar defense outlays 
peaked in fiscal 1989. 
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to 2.6  million.  Although large in absolute terms, the 
Cold War defense build-down has been and is expected 
to continue to be considerably smaller as a percentage 
of GDP and as a percentage of total employment than 
both the Korean War build-down and the Vietnam War 
build-down. However, for reasons discussed below, the 
absolute decline in  employment in the private sector 
defense industry is expected to be comparable to that 
which occurred during  the Vietnam War build-down. 
Table 1  provides data on real defense outlaysand 
total defense-related employment for the current and 
previous two build-downs.3  For the current build-down, 
information is presented to date and projected through 
1997. The projections are based on two scenarios that 
we assume to be the likely upper and lower bounds of 
3Total defense-related employment consists of active duty military 
personnel, including full-lime reserves and national guard; civilian 
employees of the Department of Defense (DoD); and defense 
industry employees as defined by the DoD. The DoD series on 
defense industry employment covers employment devoted to 
fulfilling direct and indirect DoD contracts (prime contractors and 
subcontractors) in all industries that have such contracts. The DoD 
series is broader in scope than the defense-related  employment 
series published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics because the 
latter series covers only industries in which defense-related 
production represents 50 percent or  more of total output. 
defense spending over the next five years. The upper 
bound (lower defense cuts) is the path proposed in the 
Bush Administration's fiscal  1993 budget. Under that 
scenario, real defense outlays decline  a cumulative 28 
percent from fiscal 1987 to  fiscal  1997  and represent  3.6 
percent of real GDP at  the end of that  period. The  lower 
bound (greater defense cuts)  is the "deep cut" plan 
compiled (but not specifically endorsed) by the nonpar- 
tisan  Defense Budget  Project:4  Under that  scenario, 
real defense outlays are reduced a total of 38 percent 
and represent 3.1 percent of GDP by fiscal 1997. The 
decline in total  defense-related employment over the 
fiscal 1987-97 period also varies with the scenario: 2.0 
million under the Bush plan and 2.6 million under the 
deep cut plan. 
To date, the Cold War build-down has  been quite 
modest. Through fiscal 1992, real defense outlays are 
down 11  percent, or  1.1  percent of. GOP, while total 
defense-related employment is down 12.8 percent,  or 
1.1  percent of total  nonagricultural employment.  Five 
years into  the Vietnam War build-down, defense outlays 
were down the  equivalent of  4.7 percent of  GDP and the 
decline in defense employment equaled 5.0 percent of 
total employment. For the first five years of the Korean 
War build-down, comparable figures were 5.9 percent 
and 5.3 percent, respectively. 
Assuming that fiscal 1997 is the trough of the current 
build-down, the total peak-to-trough decline in defense 
outlays is expected to be  in  the range of 28 to 38 
percent, compared  with an average of 38 percent for the 
previous two  build-downs. But because of a secular 
decline in the importance of defense spending to the 
U.S. economy, the projected declines in defense out- 
lays represent  just 2/4 to 3Y4 percent of  GDP, compared 
with 5.9 percent after  the Vietnam War and 10.5 percent 
after the Korean War. A comparably smaller effect pre- 
vails for total defense-related employment. 
While relatively smaller, the aggregate statistics  may 
understate the difficulty of the current  adjustment to 
lower defense spending. The Cold War build-down has 
been oriented more toward reducing the procurement of 
weapons produced by private sector defense contrac- 
tors  than toward decreasing troop strength. As shown in 
Chart 2, from fiscal 1987 to fiscal 1997, procurement 
outlays are expected to decline by about $38 billion in 
constant dollars, accounting for nearly half of the total 
decline in  defense  spending;  thus far,  most  of the 
reduction in defense outlays has occurred in procure- 
4The  deep cut" option is a compilation of numerous defense 
spending proposals advanced by members of Congress and private 
groups, many of which advocate even  greater reductions of defense 
outlays. The Defense Budget Project, a nonpartisan, privately- 
funded research group, does not endorse any specific defense 
spending proposals. 
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Chart  1 
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Sources:  Office  of Management and Budget, Mid-Session 
Review:  The  President's Budget  and Economic  Growth 
Agenda,  July 1992;  Defense  Budget  Project. 
Note: Outlays  are  measured on a fiscal year,  unified 
budget  basis. ment.  This  decline in procurement  spending is  similar to 
the one during the Vietnam War build-down.5  Reflecting 
the fall in procurement  spending,  defense  industry 
employment  will decline  substantially  over the  fiscal 
1987-97 period. Although this decline in defense indus- 
try employment is smaller than that during the Korean 
War build-down, it is roughly comparable in size  to that 
during the Vietnam War build-down (Table  2). 
The peace dividend 
The Cold War build-down will free a substantial amount 
of resources that can be applied to other, public and 
private pursuits. The size of the "peace dividend" is not 
an unambiguous issue,  however; it depends on what 
baseline  and  what prospective  cuts one  assumes. 
Shown in  Chart 3 are the peace dividends resulting 
from the three post-World War II build-downs, calcu- 
lated as the difference between peak year and trough 
year  defense outlays measured in constant dollars and 
as a percent of real GDP. In constant dollar terms the 
5Comparable  data for the Korean War build-down (1953-65)  are 
unavailable. 
Cold War dividend ranges from $80 billion under the 
Bush plan to $107 billion under the deep cut plan. The 
analogous amounts following the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars were $116  billion and $114  billion, respectively.  As 
noted above, while  roughly comparable in dollar terms, 
the projected Cold War peace dividend is  expected to 
be  only  about 2¾ to 3¼ percent of GOP, compared  with 
10.5 percent after the Korean  War and 5.9 percent after 
the Vietnam War. With the federal deficit currently at 
nearly 5 percent of GDP, the peace dividend would be 
only a partial solution to our deficit problem even if the 
entire amount were applied to that purpose. 
The cyclical impacts of the build-downs 
All three  defense build-downs have coincided with peri- 
ods of relatively slow overall economic growth during 
which the economy slipped into recession. While steep 
cuts in defense outlays have contributed significantly to 
slowdowns in the past, that does not appear to be the 
case  during the current build-down. By a quirk of fate, 
defense spending was a modest plus for the economy 
during the recession from 1990-Ill to 1991-I.  And 
Table 1 
Major Periods of Decline in Defense  Spending  and Employment 
Share of Tot 
Total Defense-related  Nonagricultural 
Real Defense Spendingt  Share of  Real  GOP  Employment  Employment 
(Billions of 1987 Dollars)  (Percent)  (Thousands)  (Percent) 
Korean War build-down 
1953  322.1  19.0  8,977  17.9 
1958  .239.7 
' 
13.1  6,469  12.6 
1965  .06.5  8.5  5,767  9.4 
Percent  drop 1953-65  —35.9  —10.54  —35.8  —8.5 
Vielnam  War build-down 
1968  295.8  10.7  7,955 
. 
11.6 
1973  194.0  6.0  5,100  6.6 
:  1979  181.6  4.8  4,807  5.3 
Percent  drop 1968-79  —38.6  —5,9*  —39.6  —6.3* 
Cold War build-down 
To date:  '  1987  283.1  6.3  6.657  6.5 
1992  252.1  5.2'  5,802  5.4 
Percent  drop 1987-92  '—11.0  —1.1  —12.8  —1.1 
Projected: 
Bush plan 1997  203.3  3.6  4,650  3.9 
Percent  drop 1987-97  —28.2  —2.7  —30.1  —2.6* 
Deep cut plan 1997  176.6  3.1  4,040  3.3 
Percent  drop 1987-97  —37.6 
'  —3.2  —39.3  —3.2 
Sources:  Federal Reserve  Bank of  New York;  Defense Budget Project;  U.S. Department  of Defense;  Office of  Management  and Budget, Mid- 
Session  Review: The  Presidents 8udget  and Economic Growth  Agerda,  July 1992. 
Note:  All years shown are fiscal years. 
,  tAs measured on a unified budget  basis. 
'tPercentage  point decline.  - 
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outlays since fiscal  1987 has played only a minor role in 
the below-potential  growth  that has  prevailed  since 
1989. 
During the Korean War build-down, a recession last- 
ing three quarters began in the final quarter of 1953, 
followed by a slow recovery and another three-quarter 
recession beginning in late 1957. During the Vietnam 
War build-down, the  economy was in recession from the 
end of  1969 to the  end  of 1970  and then again from  late 
1973 through early  1975. Table 3 presents the contribu- 
tion  of real defense  spending  to overall economic 
growth around the troughs of these and other  business 
cycles since the end of World War  11.6 (We consider 
1991-I  the trough of the  most recent recession. The  brief 
and unusual downturn of 1980 is omitted.) During the 
four quarters up to and including the trough quarter, 
real defense  outlays sometimes  contributed  to and 
sometimes offset declines elsewhere in the economy. 
The largest negative contributions occurred during the 
1953-54 recession—minus 1.9 percentage points—and 
during the 1970  recession—minus  1.1  percentage 
points. Both of these recessions occurred during the 
first five years of the previous two build-downs.  On 
average, real defense spending subtracted 0.3 percent- 
age points from growth  during the previous  seven 
eThe contribution-to-growth measures referred to in this section 
represent the direct contribution of changes in defense spending to 




Declines in Defense-related  Employment  during Defense Build-downs 
Memo: 
1953-65  1968-79  1987.97t  1987-92 
Total  defense-related employment  (thousands)  3,210  3,148  2,007  855 
Percent of  total change  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Defense industry employment  (thousands)  1,993  1,314  1,171  440 
Percent of  total change  62.1  41.7  58.3  51.5 
Troop strength and Department  of  Defense 
civilian employees (thousands)  1,217  1,834  836  415 
Percent of  total change  37.9  58.3  41.7  48.5 
Sources: Federal Reserve  Bank of  New York;  Defense Budget Project; U.S.  Department of  Defense;  Office of  Management  and Budget, 
Mid-Session Review:  The  President's Budget and Economic  Growth Agenda, July 1992. 
Note: All years shown are fiscal  years. 
tEstimate for  1987-97 is  based on the  Bush plan. 
tTroops include full-time reserves  and the  national guard. Department  of Defense civilian employees  are a direct  hire work force  that 
includes both U.S. and foreign  nationals. 
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Chart 2 
Changes  in  Constant  Dollar  Defense Outlays 
by..Category 
Billions  of  1987  dollars 
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Source: Bucigétaf  the United  States  Government, 
fi9cál  year  1993. 
Nofe: :Estknates.tor fiscal years  1992-97 assume  the  enactment 
of the Bush  *saiyear  1993  budget  plan. 
Other"  oOBtises  operations and  maintenance, research and 
dewetopffierit fh.laary  cOnstrucon family  housing, atomic  energy 
ddfense  activities,  and all  other defense  activities. recessions. During the most recent recession, defense 
spending was actually a small plus for the economy 
because of the temporary  upturn in defense outlays 
associated with the conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
Chart 3 
Peace DivIdend under  Alternative  Plans 
Billions of  1987 dollars  Share  of  real  GDP 
140  I  14 
Table 3 
Contribution of Real Defense Spending  to 
Real GDP Changes  around Cyclical Troughs 
Date of Recession's  Four  Quarters to  Five Quarters after 
Trough  Trough Quarter  Trough Quarter 
1949-lV  0.1  4.2 
1954-Il  —1.9  —1.2 
1958-lI  —0.1  —0.7 
1961-I  0.2  0.6 
1970-lV  —1.1  —0.5 
1975-I  0.0  —0.1 
1982-IV.  0.5  0.3 
Average  —0.3  0.4 
1991-I  0.1  —0.5 
During  the recovery period from 1991-I to 1992-Il 
defense  spending reduced real  GOP growth  by 0.5 
percentage points.  During the five quarters  after the 
trough of past business cycles,  defense outlays 
contributed an average of 0.4 percentage points to 
growth. 
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Korean  ...  Vietnam  "Deep  cut"  Bush 
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Chart 4 
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Sources:  Federal Reserve Bank  of  New  York;  Defense  Budget 
Project; U.S.  Department of  Defense; Office  of Management 
and Budget, Mid-Session Review: The  President's Budget  and 
Economic Growth Agenda, July 1992. 
Notes:  Left side of  chart  shows  peak-to-trough difference in 
rial  defense outlays.  Right  side of  chart  shows  peak-to-trough 
difference in real  defense outlays  as  a  percentage of  GDP. 
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Source: Board  of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Chart  5 
Industrial  Production  Index  Including  and 
Excluding  Defense 
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Source: Board of  Governors of  the  Federal Reserve  System. of  the structural impediments  that  has  restrained growth 
since  1989.  As Chart 4 indicates,  production of 
defense-related goods has been on a downward trend 
since 1987,  with a particularly  steep drop since 
mid-1990. The recent pattern of overall industrial pro- 
duction,  however, is essentially the same  whether 
defense is included or excluded (Chart 5). 
To assess  more  fully the contribution  of defense 
spending to the current state of the economy,  we used 
an econometric model to construct a "never-cut" base- 
line for the period from fiscal 1987 to fiscal 1992. Under 
this baseline, real defense outlays are maintained at 
their 1987-Ill level. Chart 6 presents the actual path of 
real defense outlays relative to this never-cut baseline. 
From 1987-Ill to 1989-I, real defense outlays declined a 
little over 6 percent. However,  from 1989-I to 1990-Ill, 
defense outlays held steady at  between 4 and 6 percent 
below the baseline level. Then, in response to events in 
the Persian Gull,  outlays from 1990-Ill to 1991-I 
increased to just 2 percent under the baseline. There- 
after, defense spending declined sharply, to about 89 
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percent of the baseline level by 1992-Il. 
Chart 7 presents the actual and never-cut baseline 
levels of real GDP relative to potential GDP over this 
period. These results suggest that through  1989 the 
cuts in defense spending depressed the level of real 
GDP by only modest amounts. During 1990  and the  first 
half of 1991, the upturn in defense spending stimulated 
the economy,  with actual GDP equal to  or slightly  above 
the baseline. By 1992-Il actual GDP is just one-half of  1 
percent below the baseline. Of the 5  percent cumulative 
gap between actual and potential GDP by 1992-Il, only 
about 10 percent is explained by the defense build- 
down. 
Regional and industry-level effects 
Although the macroeconomic impact of the defense 
build-down is relatively modest, the concentration of 
defense employment and output in  a relatively small 
number of states and industries will make the micro- 
economic  transition more  difficult. Just  ten  states, 
located primarily in  the Northeast and Far West regions, 
account for nearly 60 percent of all defense industry 
employment  (Table  4).8 A  state's defense employment in 
absolute terms is not necessarily a good measure of its 
economic dependence on defense, however. The more 
diversified and the larger a state's economy, the lower 
its defense employment as  a share  of total  state 
employment. Of the ten states with the most defense 
•The analysis does not include Department of Defense personnel. 
The Data Resources Inc. model was used to create this historical 
simulation. In addition to keeping real defense outlays at the 1987- 
Ill level, we assumed monetary policy  to be neutral by holding M2 
at actual levels. The additional defense spending was assumed  to 
be financed with additional government borrowing. 
Chart 6 
Real Defense Spending 
Actual  Relative to "Never-cut" Baseline 
Index:  January  1987 = 100  Chart 7 
Actual  and "Never-cut" GDP Relative to Potential 
1987  88  89  90  91  92 
Source: U.S.  Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. 
1987  88  89 
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90  91  92 
Nate: "Never-cut" baseline  is derived  from a  simulation of  the 
Data  Resources Inc. Quarterly Model of  the  U.S.  Economy. industry  employment, only four—Connecticut, Virginia, 
Massachusetts,  and  California—have economies that 
depend heavily on defense. 
Not surprisingly, the  largest  labor force  effects  of 
defense  cuts occur  in those states  with  the largest 
defense output.9 California has experienced the great- 
est defense  employment declines,  losing  roughly 
75,000 defense jobs  between fiscal 1988 and  fiscal 
1992. Under the Bush fiscal 1993 budget, California is 
projected  to lose  38,300  additional  defense jobs  in 
fiscal 1993  and a total of 124,000 defense jobs over the 
next five years.'° Job losses under  the deep cut option 
would be roughly 38 percent greater, amounting to a 
total of about 171,000 defense jobs over the next five 
years. 
Defense production in  California is concentrated in 
the aerospace,  electronics, and communications indus- 
tries. The manufacture of aircraft  and missiles, includ- 
9Our estimates  of  defense industry employment  declines for fiscal 
years 1988-91 are based on the distribution of prime contract 
awards. Projections  for fiscal 1992 and beyond are by the Defense 
Budget Project and are based on the assumption that cuts in any 
one category of defense spending will affect each state in 
proportion to its employment in that category. In reality, of course, 
the impact of reduced defense spending on each state will depend 
on the specific programs and facilities cut. 
*OThe largest labor market effects for all states under either the 
current budget or the deep cut option are projected to occur in 
fiscal 1993. The severity of  the fiscal 1993 effects is due in part to 
the winding down of outlays associated with Operation Desert 
Storm. 
Table 4 
ing engines and parts, accounted for nearly half of the 
dollar value of fiscal 1991 prime contracts awarded in 
California.'1  California's  missile industry,  which 
depends on domestic defense  for 80 percent  of its 
sales, has been particularly hard hit. Although Califor- 
nia's aircraft industries are less heavily defense-depen- 
dent, relying on the Pentagon for roughly 60 percent of 
sales,  strong  growth  in  civilian  and  foreign  defense 
demand has not been sufficient to offset declining sales 
to the Pentagon. California's communications and elec- 
tronics industries have fared better thus  far in the build- 
down, in part because defense makes up only 36 per- 
cent and 23 percent, respectively, of these industries 
sales nationwide (Table 5). Moreover, the emphasis of 
recent Pentagon budgets on developing new weapons 
and upgrading  existing systems has meant that defense 
demand for commi$nications  and electronics equipment 
has not fallen as steeply as defense demand for other 
procurement categories. 
The list of  the most severely affected states changes 
when defense industry declines are considered relative 
to  the size of each state's economy (Table  6). Under this 
criterion, Connecticut suffered the worst declines, los- 
ing 1.3 percent of total employment  between fiscal 1988 
and fiscal 1992. Defense industry cuts cost Massachu- 
setts  and Missouri each 0.9 percent of employment  over 
the same period. Connecticut remains the most heavily 
"State of California, Commission on State Finance, "Impact of 
Defense Cuts on California," Fall  1992. 
Defense Industry Employment  Declines: 
States with Largest Cuts in Absolute Terms 
Thousands of  Employees 
State 
Total Fiscal 1992 
Defense 
Employment 
Cumula  five Cuts  Fiscal 1993  Cumulative  Cuts  Fiscal 1993  Cumula  five Cuts 
Fiscal 1988-92  Cutst  Fiscal  .1993-97  CutSt  Fiscal 1993-97 
California  543.6  75.0  38.3  123.9  58.8  170.7 
Texas  -  190.3  31.8  2G.8  49.9  25.6  66.4 
New York  171.4  29.5  17.4  45.2  21.9  60.3 
Virginia  147.2  23.3  18.6  40.2  22.5  52.8 
Massachusetts  130.9  25.8  10.8  32.2  15.1  43.7 
Ohio  123.3  19.4  13.0  32.3  16.2  43.2 
Pennsylvania  115.2  15.1  12.2  30.3  15.4  40.1 
Florida  112.0  18.1  10.7  28.4  13.9  38.0 
Connecticut  90.0  19.8  10.8  25.7  .  12.5  33.8 
New Jersey  88.1  13.3  9.4  23.1  11.9  30.8 
U.S. total  2,924.7  440.3  278.9  730.8  362.7  983.2 
Notes: Figures  do not include Department of  Defense  military or  civilian employees.  The effects of  past cuts  by  state are authors estimates 
and are  based on three-year  moving averages  of  prime contract awards. Other estimates are from Conrad Schmidt and Steven  Kosiak, 
Potential  Impact of  Defense Spending Reductions  on the  Defense Industrial Labor  Force by  State. Defense  Budget Project, March 1992. 
tThe largest labor force effects for  all states, under both the  Bush fiscal 1993  budget  and the  deep  cut option, are projected to  occur  in. 
fiscal 1993. 
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Bush Fiscal 1993 Budget  Deep Cut Option affected state under both the Bush fiscal 1993 budget 
and the deep cut options, losing  1.7 percent and 2.3 
percent of total  employment,  respectively,  between 
fiscal years 1993 and 1997. 
Connecticut's defense manufacturing sector is con- 
centrated in the shipbuilding and aerospace industries 
and is dominated by defense industry  giants General 
Dynamics and United Technologies. General Dynamics' 
production of submarines at its Electric Boat Division in 
Groton has  been hurt particularly badly by the build- 
down. The last  Trident submarine  produced by Electric Boat 
was funded in 1991,  while those planned  for 1992 and 
Industries with Largest Defense Out  put :  1990 
Industry 
Defense Output 
(Millions of 1982 Dollars) 
Total 
Industry Output 
(Millions 011982 Dollars) 
Defense Share 
of  Industry Output 
(Percent) 




Shipbuilding and repair 
Guided missiles and space vehicles 
Aircraft  and missile parts and equipment 
Ordnance and accessories 
Electronic components  and accessories 
































Total of above  113,391.9  791,233.4  14.3 
U.S. total  --- 
239,212.1  -  6,906,847.5 
—-.- 
3.5 
Source:  David Henry, Industrial Output Effects of  Planned Defense Spending: 1990-1994,  U.S. Department of Commerce,  February 1991. 
tExcludes engines and parts. 
rTa:6 
Defense  Industry Employment  Declines: 
States with Largest Cuts as a Percentage of Fiscal 1992 State Employment 
Percent 
- 
Total Fiscal 1992 
Defense  ative Cuts 
Bush Fiscal 1993 Budget  Do  ep Cut Option 
Cumul  Fiscal 1993  Cumulative Cuts  Fiscal 1993  Cumulative  Cuts 
State  Employment  Fiscal 1988-92  Cuts  Fiscal 1993-97  Cuts  Fiscal 1993-97 
Connecticut  6.0  1.3  0.7  1.7  0.8  2.3 
Virginia  5.3  0.8  0.7  1.4  0.8  1.9 
Massachusetts  4.8  0.9  0.4  1.2  0.6  1.6 
California  4.4  0.6  0.3  1.0  0.5  1.4 
Maryland  4.1  0.7  0.5  1.1  0.6  1.4 
Washington  3.5  0.4  0.2  0.8  0.4  1.1 
Missouri  3.5  0.9  0.4  1.0  0.5  1.3 
Colorado  3.3  0.5  0.2  0.7  0.3  1.0 
Arizona  3.2  0.7  0.3  0.8  0.4  1.1 
Alaska  3.1  0.3  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.8 
U.S. total  2.7  0.4  0.3  0.7  0.3  0.9 
Memo: New York  2.2  0.4  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.8 
New Jersey  2.6  0.4  0.3  0.7  0.4  0.9 
Sources:  The effects of  past cuts  are Federal Reserve  Bank of New York  estimates.  Other estimates are from Conrad Schmidt and Steven 
Kosiak, Potential Impact of  Defense Spending Reductions  on the Defense  Industrial Labor Force by State, Defense  Budget Project, 
March 1992. 
Note: Total nonagricultural U.S.  employment is  as  of  September  1992, while total nonagricultural employment tor  states is  as  of  July 1992. 
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of Electric Boat's Seawolf submarine has been cut dra- 
matically. Finally, there is no significant possibility of 
converting Electric Boat's facilities to commercial pro- 
duction: the U.S. shipbuilding industry no longer has a 
civilian market for its products. 
Several factors combine to make  the transition for the 
hard-hit  states  relatively difficult.  First, the effect of 
defense cuts on total state employment will be greater 
than the above figures suggest, because the figures 
exclude indirect impacts that depend on spending by 
defense industry employees. One way to illustrate the 
total impact of defense job losses on a state's economy 
is to draw a parallel with steel industry declines. The 
most  severely affected  states—Pennsylvania,  Ohio, 
Michigan,  Indiana,  and  Illinois—suffered  cumulative 
steel industry job losses of 0.6 to 1.6 percent of state 
employment between 1979 and 1984. These declines 
are similar to the  job losses forecast for defense-depen- 
dent states over the next few years. During the period of 
sharpest steel industry decline, unemployment in steel- 
dependent states  exceeded the national  rate  by an 
average of 2 percentage points—though, of course, one 
cannot determine precisely how much of the difference 
reflects the direct and indirect effects of the steel  indus- 
try decline. 
Second, current economic weakness in a number of 
defense-dependent  states—caused  in  part by  past 
defense industry  cutbacks—will make it more difficult 
for laid-off  workers  to find  new jobs. Unemployment 
rates  in the  most  heavily  defense-dependent states 
have risen far more rapidly than the rates for the United 
States as a whole.'2 Finally, the occupational profile of 
defense industry jobs—well-paying manufacturing 
employment  with an unusually high  share of administra- 
tive support, professional, and technical workers—sug- 
gests that  these positions will be particularly difficult for 
states to replace.'3 
The effect of the build-down on  localities could be 
significantly more severe than the impact at the state 
level. Regions  that rely heavily on defense and have  few 
nondefense industries to provide alternative sources of 
employment are  most vulnerable.  Even where other 
jobs are available locally, they may be a poor  match for 
the skills of former defense workers. Those defense 
12A recent study by Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence  Katz suggests 
that although the rise in unemployment  associated with a negative 
shock such as the defense build-down will dissipate within five to 
seven  years. employment growth will remain on a permanently lower 
path ('Regional  Evolutions.' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 
1992:1. pp. 1-75). 
'3David Henry and Richard Oliver.  'The Defense Buildup, 1977-1985: 
Effects on Production and Labor,' Monthly Labor Review,  August 
1987. pp. 3-11. 
workers who succeed in finding other local employment 
must often accept lower wages than they enjoyed in 
defense  manufacturing.  The Congressional  Budget 
Office recently used the  hypothetical  closing of the  Bath 
Iron Works in Maine to illustrate one possible worst- 
case scenario of defense cuts.'4 The 11,000 workers 
employed by Bath Iron Works, a major shipbuilder for 
the  U.S.  Navy,  constitute  roughly 5 percent of total 
employment  in south coastal Maine. The  Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that the combined direct and 
indirect impacts of  the hypothetical closing of the facility 
would raise the  rate of unemployment along  Maine's 
south coast by as much as 7 percentage points. More- 
over, prospects for the reemployment of former defense 
workers within the region are poor because few alter- 
native sources of local  employment use  comparable 
skills or offer comparable pay. 
In sum, the concentration of defense spending in a 
relatively small  number of states  and  industries  will 
make the microeconomic transition  to lower defense 
spending  more  difficult.  The build-down will most 
severely affect those  states  that depend  heavily  on 
defense, including Connecticut, Virginia,  and  Massa- 
chusetts.  In  absolute  terms, however,  California is 
expected to lose the greatest number of jobs. Similarly, 
the most  defense-dependent  industries—including 
shipbuilding,  missiles,  and  ordnance—are  likely  to 
experience declines in both defense and total industry 
output. 
Conclusion 
Although the current defense  build-down is  large in 
absolute terms, it is considerably smaller as a percent 
of GOP and as a percent of total employment than the 
build-downs after the wars in Korea and Vietnam. That 
comparison, however,  may understate the difficulty  of 
the adjustment. The current build-down  is heavily 
weighted  toward  procurement,  resulting  in absolute 
declines in private sector defense industry employment 
comparable to those that occurred during the Vietnam 
War build-down. 
Because of its relatively modest proportions, the cur- 
rent build-down will yield a relatively small peace divi- 
dend.  Therefore, the build-down by itself is likely to 
provide only a partial solution to our deficit  problem, 
even if the cuts  in  defense spending are  not  offset 
elsewhere in the budget. 
The  available evidence suggests that, at the national 
level, the defense build-down to date  has  played a 
relatively minor role in the below-potential growth that 
the U.S. economy has experienced since 1989. How- 
'4Congressional  Budget Office, "The Economic Effects of Reduced 
Defense Spending.  February 1992. 
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trated geographically, with the result that some states 
are  more  adversely  affected than  others.  The  most 
severely affected states are those where the defense 
industry is a significant fraction of the economy,  such as 
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Connecticut, Virginia, and Massachusetts. But a num- 
ber of other states, led by California, Texas,  and New 
York, continue to experience large absolute declines in 
defense industry employment. 